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Federal Ignorance and the Battle for 
Supervised Injection Sites 
BEN LONGNECKER* 
From 1999 to 2017, over 400,000 people have died from 
opioid overdoses. The federal government recognizes the 
opioid epidemic as a crisis, yet it has failed to slow the surge 
of overdose deaths. Some states are, therefore, looking at the 
implementation of supervised injection sites. There are over 
100 supervised injection sites around the world in twelve dif-
ferent countries, and these sites have produced hopeful data 
on counteracting the opioid crisis’s negative societal effects. 
However, the federal government has seemingly ignored any 
empirical evidence and continues to threaten state-spon-
sored supervised injection sites with criminal prosecution. 
This Note argues that any federal challenge to these super-
vised injection sites should be unsuccessful and will also dis-
pel federal authorities’ conclusory allegations that these 
sites do not practically combat the harms of the opioid crisis. 
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On May 5, 2017, Joseph “Blake” Hadden was found dead in his 
apartment.1 He was hours away from walking across a stage to re-
ceive his diploma from Furman University in Greenville, South Car-
olina.2 Blake died from an overdose of an opioid-based substance 
named fentanyl, a drug thirty times more deadly than heroin.3 Blake 
was among the 70,000 estimated deaths due to drug overdose in 
 
 1 Angelia Davis & Anna Lee, Furman Student Died from Fentanyl Over-
dose, STATE (June 17, 2017, 9:53 PM), https://www.thestate.com/news/state/ 
south-carolina/article156811924.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
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2017.4 Around 30,000 of those overdoses can be attributed to fenta-
nyl and similar synthetic opioids.5 That is eighty-one overdoses each 
day, a forty-five percent increase in fentanyl-related deaths com-
pared to 2016.6 In comparison, twice as many people died from fen-
tanyl in 2017 than from murders and non-negligent homicides7—
enough for the entire undergraduate student population of Furman 
University (Blake Hadden’s would-be alma mater) to fatally over-
dose ten times.8 
This Note will address the debate over establishing supervised 
injection sites in the United States to combat the opioid crisis—
which the federal government has labeled a “public health emer-
gency.”9 Though the problems associated with the opioid crisis ex-
tend beyond potential solutions like supervised injection sites, the 
results of injection sites abroad have been unequivocally successful 
in reducing overdoses, blood-borne diseases, and referring margin-
alized populations to drug treatment services.10 This Note argues 
that these supervised injection sites are practical solutions based on 
empirical evidence from around the world11 and dispels federal au-
thorities’ conclusory allegations that these sites are “dangerous.”12 
In addition, this Note criticizes the simplistic approach other 
 
 4 Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.dru-
gabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates (last updated Jan. 
2019). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’ 
Overdose Deaths Set a Record Last Year., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-over-
dose-deaths.html. 
 7 Total Number of Murders in the United States in 2017, by State, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/195331/number-of-murders-in-the-us-by-
state/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 8 Furman University: Facts, FURMAN U., https://www.furman.edu/ 
about/facts/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (listing undergraduate enrollment at 2,800 
students). 
 9 Ending America’s Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/opioids/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 10 See infra notes 81–117. 
 11 See infra notes 81–117. 
 12 See, e.g., Rod J. Rosenstein, Opinion, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize 
It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/ 
opioids-heroin-injection-sites.html. 
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scholarly publications have taken when applying relevant Supreme 
Court jurisprudence to answer this question: does the federal gov-
ernment overstep its authority by challenging the creation of super-
vised injection sites? 
Part I briefly discusses the beginnings of the opioid crisis, the 
current ineffective responses from the federal government, and the 
need for innovative solutions like supervised injection sites. Part II 
details how these supervised injection sites operate and examines 
empirical evidence from existing supervised injection sites around 
the world and in the United States. Part III describes the federal gov-
ernment’s position against supervised injection sites to lay a foun-
dation for Part IV, which evaluates the “state versus federal” conflict 
and how a future court may resolve the matter. This Note concludes 
on an optimistic note. Supervised injection sites save lives and are 
an effective response to the opioid crisis. These sites may have an 
uphill battle when facing the federal government, but their existence 
is hope for the United States as it attempts to stabilize the opioid 
crisis. 
I. A HISTORICAL AND MODERN ACCOUNT OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 
While this Note primarily focuses on the legality of state-spon-
sored, supervised injection sites as a response to individuals who 
inject dangerous opioids, a brief historical account of the opioid cri-
sis is necessary to understand why opioid use became a public emer-
gency—and why federal intervention has been ineffective. 
A. The War on Drugs: A Primer 
Modern federal anti-opioid policies have roots in the infamous 
“War on Drugs.”13 In the 1960s, the federal government had a mili-
tant stance against illegal drug use based on a simple assumption: 
drugs are dangerous and linked to violent crime.14 The Nixon ad-
ministration coined the phrase “War on Drugs,” after passing the 
Controlled Substances Act.15 This act gave law enforcement more 
 
 13 Ti’a Latice Hazel, Who Can Handle Marijuana the Best? The States’ Fail-
ure to Regulate Marijuana and the Federal Government’s Sole Power to Regulate 
Marijuana, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 495, 498 (2017). 
 14 Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 233 (2015). 
 15 See Hazel, supra note 13, at 498. 
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power to combat illegal drug use, primarily through incarceration.16 
In addition, the Controlled Substances Act also recognized the need 
for a long-term federal drug policy that encompassed the creation of 
effective health programs to minimize the harms of drug abuse.17 
The “War on Drugs” has continued to this day, and scholars have 
critiqued federal drug policy for being applied in a racially dispro-
portionate manner,18 failing to reduce the use of illegal drugs,19 and 
further exacerbating the dangers associated with illegal drug use.20 
However, federal authorities claim that the Department of Justice’s 
aggressive stance against illegal drug use is delivering “results”21 
and adamantly oppose the creation of supervised injection sites as 
an innovative solution to confront drug abuse.22 But, as explained 
below, the current federal drug policies have not meaningfully im-
pacted the surge of citizens who abuse opioids.23 
B. Opioids Explained, and the Rise of the Opioid Crisis 
Opioid abuse is a relatively new crisis that began in the 1990s.24 
Pharmaceutical companies facilitated a new era of treating pain 
 
 16 Id. at 498–500. 
 17 21 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 18 Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 262 (2002). 
 19 See Baradaran, supra note 14, at 232. 
 20 Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in 
Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1089, 1098 (2009). 
 21 Rosenstein, supra note 12. In terms of general “results,” the federal gov-
ernment has seized millions of pounds of drugs a year. Robert Longley, Statistics 
from the War on Drugs Tell a Story, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/statistics-from-the-war-on-drugs-4083707. How-
ever, prohibition of any drug—at its foundation—is too simplistic of an approach 
to deter the use of harmful substances. See CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE & ABIGAIL R. 
HALL, CATO INST., FOUR DECADES AND COUNTING: THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF 
THE WAR ON DRUGS 3–4 (2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-811-updated.pdf. 
 22 See Rosenstein, supra note 12. 
 23 See Robert Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the Throes of Addiction: Why A 
National Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Is Needed Before It Is Too Late, 
37 WHITTIER L. REV. 117, 118 (2016). 
 24 See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
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management through the prescription of opioids,25 a class of drug 
naturally derived from or artificially produced to mimic the chemi-
cal structure of the opium poppy plant.26 Opioids work by activating 
certain nerve receptors in the brain that trigger the same biochemical 
brain processes that reward people with feelings of pleasure—lead-
ing doctors to prescribe them as pain relievers.27 As someone rou-
tinely takes opioids, their nerve receptors become less responsive, 
requiring increased dosages to produce pleasure comparable to pre-
vious drug-taking episodes.28 However, repeat exposure to escalat-
ing dosages alters the brain to function normally only if opioids are 
in one’s system,29 which can lead to daily drug use to avert the un-
pleasant symptoms of drug withdrawal; further prolonged use may 
permanently alter the part of the brain that enables compulsive drug-
seeking behavior.30 While modern science acknowledges that opioid 
pain relievers are generally safe when taken for a short time, contin-
ued use has dangerous risks of developing the type of dependence 
that could lead to overdoses and death.31 
Though physicians have historically been concerned with long-
term opioid treatment,32 this new era of opioids originated from a 
seemingly innocuous correspondence published in the 1980 edition 
of the New England Journal of Medicine.33 One paragraph of the 
letter stated—with minimal statistical evidence, citing only a single 
study of approximately 11,000 people—that “despite widespread 
use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is 
 
 25 Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.dru-
gabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last updated Feb. 2020). 
 26 Prescription Opioids: What are Prescription Opioids?, NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescription-
opioids (last updated June 2019). 
 27 Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid De-
pendence: Implications for Treatment, SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., July 2002, at 13, 14. 
 28 Id. at 15. 
 29 Id. at 14. 
 30 Id. at 15. 
 31 Opioids: Brief Description, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
 32 Jack Hubbard et al., Opioid Abuse: The Fall of A Prince, 21 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L.J. 159, 167 (2018). 
 33 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial 
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009). 
2020] FEDERAL IGNORANCE AND THE BATTLE FOR SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES 1151 
 
 
rare in medical patients with no history of addiction.”34 Subse-
quently, this correspondence was cited in over 400 medical papers 
to support the idea that addiction is not likely to occur in patients 
treated with opioids.35 
Pharmaceutical companies, such as Purdue Pharma, used this 
letter to aggressively market opioids and trained their sales repre-
sentatives to falsify that the addiction risk of pain-relieving opioids 
was “less than one percent.”36 This misrepresentation was brought 
to light in 2007, when several executives at an affiliate of Purdue 
Pharma pled guilty to criminal charges of misrepresenting the harm-
ful effects of opioid addiction and were forced to pay over $600 mil-
lion in fines.37 By that time, however, many physicians had become 
comfortable prescribing opioids for patients that suffered from acute 
and chronic pain, marking the beginning of the modern-day opioid 
crisis.38 
Scholars note two additional factors that may have contributed 
to the opioid crisis. The first occurred in 2001 when the Joint Com-
mission—a non-profit organization that accredits over 22,000 health 
care organizations and programs in the United States39—established 
Pain Management Standards that classified pain as a “fifth vital 
sign.”40 This new mandate required that health care providers ask 
every patient about their relative pain levels.41 Advocates have since 
argued that this pain standard led physicians to conclude that pain 
was being undertreated and resulted in increased issuance of opioids 
 
 34 Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Nar-
cotics, 302 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 123, 123 (1980). 
 35 Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 167. 
 36 Purdue Pharma also relied upon a separate study on the treatment of burn 
units to rationalize their advocacy for the widespread use of opioids to treat pain—
though this study also lacked detailed statistical evidence. See Van Zee, supra 
note 33, at 223. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 168. 
 39 Facts About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.joint-
commission.org/about-us/facts-about-the-joint-commission/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2020). 
 40 Kristina Fiore, Opioid Crisis: Scrap Pain as 5th Vital Sign?, MEDPAGE 
TODAY (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/ 
publichealth/57336. 
 41 Id. 
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to patients.42 Further, some scholars note that a recent shift towards 
patient-centric care had the unintended consequence of increased 
opioid prescriptions.43 The argument is that patients dealing with 
acute or chronic pain have come to expect opioid prescriptions, and 
those doctors who do not fulfill that expectation are given poor sat-
isfaction ratings.44 Because these satisfaction ratings may be corre-
lated to the salary or retention of a physician, a doctor may feel in-
centivized to dispense opioids to meet patient expectations.45 
As a result, the amount of opioid-based prescriptions exploded.46 
From 1997 to 2002, the United States saw a 226% increase in the 
prescription rate of fentanyl, 73% increase in the rate of morphine, 
and 402% increase in oxycodone.47 By 2005, opioids ranked second 
only to marijuana in terms of illegal drug use.48 The total sales of 
opioid pain relievers quadrupled from 1999 to 2008—alongside a 
corresponding quadrupling of the overdose death rate and a sixfold 
increase of the substance abuse treatment rate.49 
C. The Modern Crisis and Ineffective Governmental Response 
Though Congress recognized the 2000s as the “Decade of Pain 
Control,” the federal government has largely been ineffective and 
slow to respond to this nationwide crisis.50 In 2008, the Food and 
Drug Administration concluded that opioids should remain a Sched-
ule III drug,51 which is defined as a substance or chemical with a 
 
 42 Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 168. 
 43 Aleksandra Zgierska, Michael Miller & David Rabago, Patient Satisfac-
tion, Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential Unintended Consequences, 307 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1377, 1378 (2012). 
 44 Id. at 1377. 
 45 Id. at 1378. 
 46 Van Zee, supra note 33, at 224. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid 
Pain Relievers — United States, 1999–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 1487, 1488 (2011). 
 50 Tricarico, supra note 23, at 118. 
 51 Barry Meier & Eric Lipton, F.D.A. Shift on Painkillers Was Years in the 
Making, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/28/business/fda-shift-on-painkillers-was-years-in-the-making.html?_r=0& 
pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print. Notably, the federal government reclassified 
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moderate to low potential for physical and psychological depend-
ence.52 Opioid misuse and overdoses continued to rise, and in 2011, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) released a 
report stating that opioid overdoses had reached “epidemic levels.”53 
That same year, the federal government responded, and the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy released a strategic plan to reduce 
opioid drug abuse.54 This plan included expanding federal interven-
tion into four major areas: education, tracking and monitoring, 
proper medication disposal, and law enforcement.55 Despite this fed-
eral action, overdose deaths from opioids have continued to rise.56 
Between 2010 and 2017, the rate of heroin-related overdose deaths 
has increased by nearly 400%.57 In addition, overdose deaths from 
synthetic opioids nearly doubled between 2013 and 2014,58 and they 
doubled again between the years 2015 to 2016.59 
 
dangerous opioids as a Schedule II drug in 2013 to allow for stricter regulation. 
See Tricarico, supra note 23, at 125. 
 52 Drug Scheduling and Penalties, CAMPUS DRUG PREVENTION, 
https://www.campusdrugprevention.gov/content/drug-scheduling-and-penalties 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
 53 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prescription Pain-
killer Overdoses at Epidemic Levels (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/ 
media/releases/2011/p1101_flu_pain_killer_overdose.htm. 
 54 See Office of National Drug Control Policy: Prescription Drug Abuse, 
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/ 
prescription-drug-abuse1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
 55 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., EPIDEMIC: RESPONDING TO 
AMERICA’S PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE CRISIS (2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/rx_abuse_plan.pdf. 
 56 Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/ 
index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Understanding the Epi-
demic]. 
 57 Opioid Overdose: Heroin, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/heroin.html (last up-
dated Dec. 19, 2018). 
 58 Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths — 
United States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1379 
(2016) (data not including overdoses from methadone). 
 59 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DRUG 
OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf (data not including over-
doses from methadone). 
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D. Injection Drug Users and an Introduction of the Need for 
Supervised Injection Sites 
Though a significant number of the 400,000 total opioid over-
doses from 1999 to 2017 resulted from the misuse of prescription 
opioids,60 a corresponding increase in injection-based opioid users 
is now apparent.61 The CDC estimates that between 2004 and 2014, 
there has been a 93% increase in admissions to substance use disor-
der treatment facilitates for injection-based opioids.62 Other studies 
indicate that an estimated 10% to 20% of people who abuse pre-
scription opioids move to injection-based opioids.63 These injection 
drug users are at a high risk of acquiring blood borne illnesses such 
as Hepatitis C or human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”).64 Conse-
quently, the CDC observed a 133% increase in the spread of Hepa-
titis C infections between 2004 and 2014.65 In addition, anxiety 
about social rejection and arrest deter the use of health and preven-
tative services, forcing injection drug users into hidden locations 
that are poorly suited for hygienic injection and which make the us-
ers more likely to contract a blood borne disease.66 Needle-syringe 
exchange programs and increased access to drug treatment programs 
 
 60 See Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 56. 
 61 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Increase in Hepati-
tis C Infections Linked to Worsening Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioid-injection-
press-release.html. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Lindsey Dawson & Jennifer Kates, HIV and the Opioid Epidemic: 5 Key 
Points, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.kff.org/ 
hivaids/issue-brief/hiv-and-the-opioid-epidemic-5-key-points/; Alia A. Al-Tay-
yib, Stephen Koester & Paula Riggs, Prescription Opioids Prior to Injection Drug 
Use: Comparisons and Public Health Implications, 65 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 
224, 225 (2016). 
 64 Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1096. 
 65 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Increase in Hepati-
tis C Infections Linked to Worsening Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioid-injection-
press-release.html. 
 66 Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the 
United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 231 (2008). Shooting galleries are 
described as “structures such as homes—privately owned, abandoned, and other-
wise—that are frequented by [injection drug users] for the purpose of injecting.” 
Id.  
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have ameliorated some of these risks,67 but they do not address the 
lack of a supervised and hygienic setting for injection68—nor the 
fear of legal consequences that witnesses and drug users face when 
confronting a potentially deadly overdose.69 
Many different countries have therefore turned to an innovative 
solution: supervised injection sites.70 There are over one hundred 
supervised injection sites around the world that were created to ad-
dress unsupervised drug consumption.71 The theory is straightfor-
ward: allow people who are determined to consume pre-obtained 
drugs to use the drugs, but under the supervision of trained staff who 
can reduce the health risks often associated with public drug con-
sumption.72 Additionally, these sites “provide counseling and refer-
rals to vital social services and treatment options.”73 Though these 
supervised injection sites are widely recognized as successful 
abroad,74 the creation of supervised injection sites in the United 
States remains highly controversial.75 
 
 67 Syringe Services Programs (SSPs), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ssp/index.html (last updated May 23, 2019). 
 68 See Syringe Services Programs (SSPs) FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ssp/syringe-services-programs-
faq.html (last updated May 23, 2019) (explaining that, while needle exchanges 
offer resources like Naloxone and sterile syringes to users, the programs do not 
provide sterile, safe locations to inject drugs). 
 69 See Melissa Tracy et al., Circumstances of Witnessed Drug Overdose in 
New York City: Implications for Intervention, 79 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
181, 183 (2005). 
 70 See infra notes 81–109 and accompanying text. 
 71 Supervised Consumption Services, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/supervised-consumption-services (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2020). 
 72 See id. 
 73 Jessica Cohen, Supervised Injection Facilities Face Obstacles, But That 
Shouldn’t Stop Them, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.healthaf-
fairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181127.121405/full/. 
 74 See, e.g., EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, 
DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS: AN OVERVIEW OF PROVISION AND EVIDENCE 
(2018), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2734/POD 
_Drug%20consumption%20rooms.pdf [hereinafter DRUG CONSUMPTION 
ROOMS]. 
 75 See Elana Gordon, What’s the Evidence that Supervised Drug Injection 
Sites Save Lives?, NPR (Sept. 7, 2018, 2:40 PM), 
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II. HOW SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES OPERATE AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
A. A Look Inside a Supervised Injection Site 
As mentioned above, a supervised injection site is a facility 
where injection drug users may inject drugs that are obtained else-
where while under the supervision of healthcare providers who are 
well-equipped to administer Naloxone—the overdose antidote for 
opioids—if necessary.76 Legislation creating supervised injection 
sites does not legalize or encourage use of opioids.77 It simply gives 
high-risk, vulnerable populations a sterile place to inject the drugs—
as opposed to using a nonsterile environment.78 More significantly, 
supervised injection sites aim to connect and refer those socially 
marginalized populations to treatment and rehabilitation services.79 
Medical professionals do not assist with any injections or handle any 
drugs, but instead they offer general medical advice and recommen-
dations on how to prevent the spread of blood-borne diseases.80 
B. The Empirical Evidence 
Approximately 120 legal supervised injection sites currently op-
erate across Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.81 One 
unsanctioned, research-based supervised injection site operated in 
the United States from 2014 to 2016.82 The following Sections 





 76 Mary Clare Kennedy & Thomas Kerr, Overdose Prevention in the United 
States: A Call for Supervised Injection Sites, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 42 
(2017). 
 77 See Cohen, supra note 73. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 231. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Supervised Consumption Services, supra note 71. 
 82 Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epi-
demic: Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919, 919–20 (2017). 
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1. SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
Australia has one supervised injection site (referred to as a 
“medically supervised injecting centre”) that has operated since 
2001 in Kings Cross, Sydney.83 As of 2015, this facility has super-
vised more than 900,000 injections and responded to almost 6000 
overdoses—without a single fatality.84 A study of the facility found 
that seventy percent of the people who used this service had never 
accessed any local health service before, more than 12,000 referrals 
were made to health and social welfare services, overdose-related 
ambulance calls were reduced by eighty percent, and the local mu-
nicipality observed a fifty percent reduction in discarded needles.85 
Canada’s supervised injection sites began in Vancouver, British 
Columbia,86 but are now active in six major cities across the coun-
try.87 As in Australia, there have been no fatal overdoses reported at 
any site.88 After the first facility opened in 2002, Vancouver has ob-
served a thirty-five percent decrease in the rate of overdoses89 and a 
sixty-seven percent decrease in ambulance calls for treating over-
doses.90 Furthermore, eighteen percent of users visiting the site be-
gan a detoxification program during follow-up appointments.91 
Germany has twenty-four supervised injection sites in fifteen 
different cities,92 operating since the “3rd Amendment of German 
 
 83 Medically Supervised Injecting Centres, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND. (Feb. 
17, 2017), https://adf.org.au/insights/medically-supervised-injecting-centres/. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Evan Wood et al., Attendance at Supervised Injecting Facilities and 
Use of Detoxification Services, 354 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2512, 2512–13 
(2006). 
 87 See Interactive Map: Canada’s Response to the Opioid Crisis, GOV’T 
CAN., http://health.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/ 
opioids/responding-canada-opioid-crisis/map.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2020) 
(displaying the locations of the forty supervised injection sites across Canada 
through an interactive map). 
 88 Jennifer Ng et al., Does Evidence Support Supervised Injection Sites?, 63 
CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 866, 866 (2017). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Wood et al., supra note 86, at 2512–13. 
 92 DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, supra note 74. 
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Narcotics Law” was passed in 2000.93 Between 2001 and 2009, over 
3200 drug emergencies were treated, 710 people were saved through 
“immediate resuscitation measures,” and an estimated 75,000 drug 
users were referred to drug treatment services.94 
Luxembourg has two supervised injection sites, with the first 
opening in 2005.95 Since their inception, the facilities have super-
vised more than 56,000 injections96 and managed 1025 overdoses.97 
The total number of overdose deaths decreased from twenty-seven 
in 2007 to five in 2011.98 
The Netherlands established supervised injection sites in 1994 
and has thirty-one sites across twenty-five cities.99 While there is no 
direct empirical data surrounding these facilities, the Netherlands 
has the lowest rate of injection drug users in the European Union, 
one of the lowest percentages of HIV transmission, and a drug over-
dose death rate of 0.5 per 100,000 people.100 
Norway has two supervised injection sites in two cities.101 Since 
opening in 2005, these supervised injection sites have not had a 
 
 93 DEUTSCHE AIDS-HILFE & AKZEPT E.V., DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS IN 
GERMANY: A SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT BY THE AK KONSUMRAUM 8 (2011), 
https://www.akzept.org/pdf/aktuel_pdf/DKR07af1Eng.pdf. 
 94 See id. at 30. 
 95 EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, 
LUXEMBOURG COUNTRY DRUG REPORT 2017, at 11 (2017), 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publica-
tions/4517/TD0616153ENN.pdf. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Luxembourg Overview, INT’L NETWORK DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, 
http://www.drugconsumptionroom-international.org/index.php/locations/2015-
09-27-13-37-46/location-luxembourg (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 98 Id. 
 99 EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, 
NETHERLANDS COUNTRY DRUG REPORT 2017, at 12 (2017), 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publica-
tions/4512/TD0616155ENN.pdf. 
 100 Georgiy Vanunts, “It’s Something Like a Living Room”: My Experience of 
a Safe Drug Use Room in Amsterdam, TALKINGDRUGS (Feb. 25, 2017), 
https://www.talkingdrugs.org/its-something-like-a-living-room-my-experience-
of-safe-drug-use-room-in-amsterdam. 
 101 THOMAS CLAUSEN, THE ROLE OF THE SAFE INJECTION FACILITY IN OSLO 
AND THE OPENING HOURS ON PATTERNS OF AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS FOR 
OVERDOSE 2 (2017), 
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single reported fatality,102 and between 2015 and 2016, the super-
vised injection site in Oslo supervised almost 70,000 injections and 
prevented 600 overdoses.103 
Spain’s first site opened its doors in 2001.104 In its first year, 
nearly 2900 injection users visited the site, and doctors prevented 
157 overdoses and 113 acute reactions to drug toxicity.105 Spain ad-
ditionally observed a decrease in HIV infections for its drug users 
between 2004 and 2008 from 19.9% to 8.2%, respectively.106 
Switzerland established twelve supervised injection sites in 
eight cities107 in an attempt to curb the highest HIV rates in Western 
Europe.108 In the ten years since the sites opened, the rates of both 
HIV infections and overdose mortality rates were reduced by fifty 
percent.109 Further, seventy percent of current drug users now re-
ceive treatment—one of the highest global rates.110 
2. EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES’ UNSANCTIONED 
SUPERVISED INJECTION SITE 
In September 2014, a social service agency located in an undis-
closed urban area in the United States opened an underground, re-
search-based supervised injection site.111 This unsanctioned site col-





 102 Id. at 5. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Andy Malinowski, The Vein in Spain: Viability of Safe Injection Rooms, 
DRUGLINK, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 20, 22. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Spain Overview, INT’L NETWORK DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, 
http://www.drugconsumptionroom-international.org/index.php/locations/2015-
09-27-13-39-55/location-spain (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 107 DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, supra note 74. 
 108 Stephanie Nebehay, Swiss Drug Policy Should Serve as Model: Experts, 
REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2010, 1:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-
drugs/swiss-drug-policy-should-serve-as-model-experts-
idUSTRE69O3VI20101025. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Kral & Davidson, supra note 82, at 919. 
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were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
the University of California, San Diego.112 The purpose was to test 
the criticism directed at proposed supervised injection sites in the 
United States: despite the evidence that supervised injection sites 
have been unambiguously successful abroad, such programs would 
not benefit the public’s health.113 
In the first two years, medical personnel supervised 2574 injec-
tions.114 Two overdoses occurred, and both were reversed using Na-
loxone.115 In addition, the following statistics were observed: around 
ninety-two percent of participants reported that they would have 
otherwise injected in a public restroom, street, park, or parking lot; 
sixty-seven percent reported a “very high” rate of unsafe disposal of 
used equipment before using the site; and around thirty percent had 
experienced or witnessed an overdose outside of this particular 
site.116 No fatalities or incidents of violence occurred in the two 
years that this supervised injection site was operating and delivering 
data.117 
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO PROPOSED 
SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES 
The Federal Government is unequivocally opposed to the estab-
lishment of any supervised injection site.118  In responding to pro-
posed supervised injection sites in Vermont, the U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice for the District of Vermont—without citing any evidence—re-
leased the following press statement: 
 
 112 Id. at 920. 
 113 Janet Burns, Research Finds Signs of Recovery, Solidarity at Underground 
Safe Injection Site, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2018/01/02/research-finds-signs-of-
recovery-community-at-underground-safe-injection-site/#4d4d9bde5d23. 
 114 See Kral & Davidson, supra note 82, at 920. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 920–21. 
 117 Id. at 920. 
 118 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection Sites (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/statement-us-attorney-s-office-concerning-
proposed-injection-sites [hereinafter Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
Concerning Proposed Injection Sites]. 
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SIFs [(Supervised Injection Facilities)] are counter-
productive and dangerous as a matter of policy, and 
they would violate federal law. 
As to policy, the proposed government-sanc-
tioned sites would encourage and normalize heroin 
use, thereby increasing demand for opiates and, by 
extension, risk of overdose and overdose deaths. 
Opiate users, moreover, all-to-often [sic] believe 
they are purchasing heroin when, in fact, they are 
purchasing its common substitute, fentanyl, inges-
tion of which gives rise to greatly enhanced dangers 
of overdose and fatality. Introduction of fentanyl to 
SIFs would create additional public health risks, not 
only for the users, but for SIF staff members who 
might come in contact with that highly potent sub-
stance . . . . Such facilities would also threaten to un-
dercut existing and future prevention initiatives by 
sending exactly the wrong message to children in 
Vermont: the government will help you use heroin. 
Indeed, by encouraging and normalizing heroin in-
jection, SIFs may even encourage individuals to use 
opiates for the first time, or to switch their method of 
ingestion from snorting to injection, the latter carry-
ing greatly increased risk of fatality and overdose. 
Of equal importance, the proposed SIFs would 
violate several federal criminal laws, including those 
prohibiting use of narcotics and maintaining a pre-
mises for the purpose of narcotics use. It is a crime, 
not only to use illicit narcotics, but to manage and 
maintain sites on which such drugs are used and dis-
tributed. Thus, exposure to criminal charges would 
arise for users and SIF workers and overseers.119 
Rod Rosenstein, the then-acting Deputy Attorney General of the 
United States, reiterated this federal opposition to supervised 
 
 119 Id. 
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injection sites in an opinion article published in the New York Times 
on August 27, 2018, titled Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It.120 
Rosenstein argued that supervised injection sites are “very danger-
ous and would only make the opioid crisis worse”—and, further, 
that increased federal prosecutions  are slowing the “surge in over-
dose deaths.”121 These sites, according to him, would “normalize 
drug use and facilitate addiction,” and Rosenstein called establish-
ing “any location for the purpose of facilitating illicit drug use” ille-
gal,122 and violators should expect “swift and aggressive action” by 
the federal government.123 To end the opioid crisis, Rosenstein as-
serted that the focus of the federal government should be on educa-
tion, treatment, and prosecution.124 
Rosenstein was primarily responding to locally-proposed super-
vised injection sites in cities such as New York,125 Philadelphia,126 
San Francisco,127 and Seattle.128 After Rosenstein’s article, Califor-
nia’s governor, Jerry Brown, vetoed a supervised injection site bill, 
citing his fear of “expos[ing] local officials and health care profes-
sionals to potential federal criminal charges.”129 Other locations, 
 
 120 Rosenstein, supra note 12. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See, e.g., William Neuman, De Blasio Moves to Bring Safe Injection Sites 
to New York City, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/05/03/nyregion/nyc-safe-injection-sites-heroin.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-
nytmetro. 
 126 See, e.g., Kristen De Groot, This City Wants to Allow Supervised Drug In-
jection Sites to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, YAHOO! (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/city-wants-allow-supervised-drug-
000038369.html. 
 127 See, e.g., German Lopez, The Trump Administration’s Threat Against Safe 
Injection Sites is Working, VOX (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/2/17927864/safe-injection-
site-trump-jerry-brown-california. 
 128 See, e.g., Seattle Budget Includes Money for Safe-Injection Site, KIRO7, 
https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/seattle-budget-includes-money-for-safe-in-
jection/651500019 (last updated Nov. 21, 2017, 9:40 AM). 
 129 See Lopez, supra note 127. 
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like Philadelphia, began moving forward with plans to open super-
vised injection sites, despite explicit federal opposition.130 
The federal government responded to this movement on Febru-
ary 5, 2019,131 when U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, William McSwain, filed a civil lawsuit opposing Philadel-
phia’s supervised injection site.132 McSwain asked a federal judge 
to declare supervised injection site operations illegal under federal 
law.133 The federal judge disagreed with the United States’ position 
and reasoned that the relevant Controlled Substances Act statute 
(discussed below)134 was never intended to extend to medical treat-
ment programs that are built for harm reduction purposes.135 
McSwain responded with the statement that “[t]oday’s opinion is 
merely the first step in a much longer legal process that will play 
out. This case is obviously far from over. We look forward to con-
tinuing to litigate it, and we are very confident in our legal posi-
tion.”136 
IV. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL: THE FIGHT OVER SUPERVISED 
INJECTION SITES 
Putting politics aside, this looming “state versus federal” con-
flict raises several legal questions that this Note will seek to answer. 
(1) Do states have the authority to create supervised injection sites? 
(2) If so, does the existing federal law apply to supervised injection 
 
 130 See, e.g., Aubrey Whelan, Here’s How Safehouse, Philly’s Proposed Safe-
injection Site, Will Operate, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 8, 2018), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/health/addiction/safe-injection-site-philadelphia-
safehouse-faq-20181008.html. 
 131 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1, United States v. Safehouse, 408 
F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 19-0519). 
 132 Larissa Morgan, The Regulatory Battle Over Safe Injection Sites, REG. 
REV. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/08/morgan-regula-
tory-battle-over-safe-injection-sites/. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 135 Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 614. 
 136 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Uni ted States Attor-
ney McSwain on Today’s Opinion in the United States v. Safehouse Litigation 
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-at-
torney-mcswain-today-s-opinion-united-states-v-safehouse. 
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sites? (3) And, if that is true, should the federal government be able 
to successfully prosecute these individuals? 
A. State and Local Authority to Create Supervised Injection Sites 
There is little question as to whether a state or local municipality 
has the authority to create a supervised injection site. This authority 
is founded in “police powers,” which historically have granted local 
governments the authority to regulate their respective public’s 
health, safety, and morals.137 The police power represents the sov-
ereign power afforded to states under the United States’ federal sys-
tem, and only excludes those areas explicitly surrendered to the fed-
eral government under the Constitution.138 Though police powers 
are not limitless, courts typically construe them broadly.139 These 
powers legitimize state actions to ensure that communities live 
safely in environments conducive to proper health and moral stand-
ards, as well as promoting broadly-defined social goods.140 
In the particular context of public health, police powers include 
those laws or regulations aimed at improving relevant populations’ 
morbidity and mortality rates.141 The police powers allow state and 
local governments to pass laws preventing injury and disease,142 
promoting vaccinations,143 and regulating sanitation,144 waste dis-
posal,145 and air quality.146 Though the creation of any supervised 
injection site arguably runs contrary to federal law,147 states have 
 
 137 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 
92 (rev. 2d ed. 2008). 
 138 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824). 
 139 E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); see Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 485 
(2004). 
 140 See GOSTIN, supra note 137, at 92. 
 141 Id. at 94. 
 142 See TOM CHRISTOFFEL & STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC: 
LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY PREVENTION 25–29 (1993). 
 143 See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). 
 144 See, e.g., People of City of Lakewood by & on Behalf of People v. Haase, 
596 P.2d 392, 394 (Colo. 1979). 
 145 See, e.g., Singleton v. City of Hamilton, 515 N.E.2d 8, 13 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986). 
 146 See, e.g., Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm’n, 279 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1971). 
 147 See infra notes 190–206 and accompanying text. 
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still passed laws that are prohibited under federal law or disfavored 
by federal policymakers.148 For instance, many state governments 
have passed medical marijuana laws, exempting those qualified us-
ers from state criminal prosecution149—though under federal law, 
marijuana still remains illegal to possess or consume per the Con-
trolled Substances Act.150 So, while federal authorities have ex-
pressed their opinion that supervised injection sites are unlawful as 
a matter of federal law, this apparent federal hostility is not enough 
to prevent states from establishing supervised injection sites in ac-
cordance with their lawful police powers.151 In addition, using state 
legislation to create a supervised injection site would eliminate any 
uncertainty about such a facility conflicting with state laws or con-
stitutions, and those states would be on the strongest footing to resist 
challenges from the federal government.152 
A supervised injection site may also be enacted through a local 
municipality, as all states delegate some police powers to counties, 
cities, or towns to pass laws or ordinances in the name of public 
well-being.153 These programs must be supported by reasonable ev-
idence that they will be effective in combatting an existing health 
threat.154 A local government could enact an ordinance to create a 
supervised injection site, consistent with other public health policy 
innovations like needle prescription laws.155 However, locally-
passed ordinances or laws could be subjected to claims that they are 
 
 148 See Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1107. 
 149 See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 
16, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-
laws.aspx. 
 150 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844 (2018). 
 151 See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 233. 
 152 Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1106–07. 
 153 See, e.g., Ass’n of Home Appliance Manufacturers v. City of New York, 
36 F. Supp. 3d 366, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that while “[p]olice powers 
repose with the states, . . . New York State delegates certain of such powers—e.g., 
legislative authority relating to local safety, health and well-being—to its munic-
ipalities through the state constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law and the 
General Cities Law”) (citations omitted). 
 154 See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 233. 
 155 Id. 
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in conflict with state law and, therefore, preempted.156 To avoid 
those potential constitutional problems, states would be better off 
establishing a supervised injection site through their state legisla-
ture. 
B. Prosecuting a Supervised Injection Site 
Before the “War on Drugs” began, the federal government’s role 
in prosecuting drug crimes was relatively modest.157 However, the 
passage of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 empowered the 
federal government with almost unlimited jurisdiction158 after Con-
gress rationalized that the trafficking, possession, or use of illegal 
drugs “ha[d] a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and 
welfare of the American people.”159 Although state governments are 
not necessarily obligated to follow federal drug laws,160 the federal 
government has mentioned two different theories of prosecution, 
which would potentially criminalize the operation and use of super-
vised injection sites: (1) 21 U.S.C. § 844 (addressing simple posses-
sion);161 and (2) 21 U.S.C. § 856 (otherwise known as the “Crack 
House Statute”).162 Both of these statutes will be addressed accord-
ingly. 
1. SIMPLE POSSESSION 
Under § 844, it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or inten-
tionally to possess a controlled substance.”163 However, under its 
theory of prosecution, the federal government would be limited to 
prosecuting the injection drug users, not the site workers.164 Unless 
supervised injection site employees actually possess, hold, or 
 
 156 See id. (“[T]he attempt in Atlantic City, NJ, to implement an syringe ex-
change program was successfully challenged in court by the local prosecutor, who 
argued that it was prohibited by state drug law.”). 
 157 Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1113. 
 158 Id. 
 159 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018). 
 160 See, e.g., State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 149. 
 161 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
 162 21 U.S.C. § 856; see also Jacob A. Epstein, Note, Molly and the Crack 
House Statute: Vulnerabilities of A Recuperating Music Industry, 23 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L. REV. 95, 102–03 (2014). 
 163 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
 164 See id. 
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control the drugs brought into the facilities, the federal government 
should be unable to successfully bring criminal charges against 
them.165 Indeed, the supervised injection site patients maintain sole 
control and dominion over their drugs while in the facilitates, so at 
no time would any health care professional directly handle any of 
the drugs.166 The operators of supervised injection sites act, instead, 
as health, drug treatment, and safe-injection resources, prepared to 
help any overdosing individual.167 
The government may be able to assert that these healthcare offi-
cials were in “constructive” possession of these substances,168 but 
this should be an attenuated and unsuccessful argument. To have 
constructive possession over a narcotic, a person must know of its 
presence and have the power to exercise dominion and control over 
it,169 though if a person has exclusive control over the premise where 
the contraband is found, then knowledge and control may be in-
ferred.170 But if no individual has that exclusive control over a su-
pervised injection site, any claim of constructive possession would 
be seemingly defeated—“[m]ere proximity to contraband, presence 
on property where it is found, and association with a person or per-
sons having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive 
possession.”171 In essence, the government would have to prove that 
these operators had the ultimate control over the drugs,172 which any 
health official at a given site would likely deny since no supervised 
injection employee directly assists with injections.173 The use of 
simple possession statutes should thus be limited to the individuals 
entering and leaving a supervised injection site.174 However, as Rod 
Rosenstein mentioned in his article, the federal government’s best 
 
 165 Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 231. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See, e.g., United States v. Rebolledo-Delgadillo, 820 F.3d 870, 875 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 169 E.g., United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 170 E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 171 United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.1985)). 
 172 E.g., United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 173 See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 231. 
 174 See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2018). 
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argument against the establishment of these supervised injection 
sites is likely through the application of the “Crack House Stat-
ute.”175 
2. THE “CRACK HOUSE STATUTE” 
In 1986, the federal government amended the Controlled Sub-
stances Act by adding § 856, which would be known as the “Crack 
House Statute.”176 This statute was designed to punish those who 
used their property to run drug businesses in the midst of the 1980s 
crack epidemic.177 In particular, this statute prohibited the operation 
of houses or buildings—such as crack houses—where crack, co-
caine, or other drugs are manufactured and used.178 Section (a)(1) of 
this statute originally stated that it shall be unlawful to “knowingly 
open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or using any controlled substance.”179 Section (a)(2) made 
it illegal to do the following:  
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, 
either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mort-
gagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, 
or make available for use, with or without compen-
sation, the building, room, or enclosure for the pur-
pose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distrib-
uting, or using a controlled substance.180 
This statute, however, was amended in 2003 by further broaden-
ing the language to reach “any place,” whether operating “perma-
nently or temporarily.”181 This amendment was originally proposed 
 
 175 See Rosenstein, supra note 12 (describing how the federal government 
could use the “Crack House Statute” to prosecute the operators of supervised in-
jection sites). 
 176 See Epstein, supra note 162, at 102–03. 
 177 Id. at 103; e.g., United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 178 Richard Belfiore, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Federal “Crack-House Statute” Criminalizing Maintaining Place for Purpose of 
Making, Distributing, or Using Controlled Drugs, 21 U.S.C.A. § 856, 116 A.L.R. 
Fed. 345 (1993) (detailing the different courts’ interpretations of Section 856). 
 179 21 U.S.C. § 856 (1988). 
 180 Id. 
 181 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2006). 
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as the “Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy”182 Act or the 
RAVE Act.183 Though eventually passed as the “Illicit Drug Anti-
Proliferation Act of 2003,” the initial title of the RAVE Act is indic-
ative of the congressional purpose behind amending the “Crack 
House Statute,” i.e., directly targeting the producers of dance events, 
such as raves, at which drugs like methylenedioxymethampheta-
mine (“MDMA,” colloquially known as “ecstasy”) were often 
used.184 This increased federal jurisdiction covered not only those 
places where drugs are made or consumed, but also those premises 
that make available or profit off illegal drug use on their respective 
properties.185 
United States v. Chen illustrates how the “Crack House Statute” 
has been applied.186 There, the defendant, a motel owner, encour-
aged his tenants to use, purchase, and sell drugs out of his motel 
rooms—so long as the participants continued to pay rent.187 The de-
fendant was ultimately convicted.188 Similarly, in United States v. 
Meshack, the defendant ran a bar-b-que shop that operated simulta-
neously as a location to purchase drugs.189 Like in Chen, the defend-
ant was also convicted.190 
In both cases, the Fifth Circuit found that drug distribution was 
a significant purpose surrounding the businesses, and the “Crack 
House Statute” was lawfully applied.191 Although a supervised in-
jection site will not distribute, encourage, or profit off the consump-
tion of illegal opioids, the federal government may nonetheless ar-
gue—as Rod Rosenstein claimed—that the purpose of these sites is 
 
 182 See Mariah Blake, This Law Made It a Lot More Dangerous to Take Ec-
stasy, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2015/01/joe-biden-raves-mdma-death/. 
 183 MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10113, WAR ON DRUGS: 
LEGISLATION IN THE 108TH CONGRESS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2004). 
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 185 See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2018). 
 186 United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 183. 
 189 United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 571 (5th Cir. 2000), amended on 
reh’g in part, 244 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 190 Id. at 583. 
 191 Id. at 583; Chen, 913 F.2d at 193. 
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to facilitate drug use, which would potentially bring these sites 
within the purview of the federal government’s reach.192 
B. Does Section 856 Preempt State Legislation Authorizing a 
Supervised Injection Site? 
Federal opposition to supervised injection sites asserts that these 
facilities fall plainly under subsection (a)(1) of the “Crack House 
Statute”193 and that any state law creating a site would therefore be 
preempted as explicitly indicated by 21 U.S.C. § 901, which pro-
vides the following: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to oc-
cupy the field in which that provision operates, in-
cluding criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any 
State law on the same subject matter which would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless 
there is a positive conflict between that provision of 
this subchapter and that State law so that the two can-
not consistently stand together.194 
As in all preemption cases, congressional purpose is the “ulti-
mate touchstone.”195 When considering preemption, the starting as-
sumption is that the historic police powers of the states are not to be 
“superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress.”196 The explicit purpose of Congress when 
crafting the Controlled Substances Act was to preempt those state 
 
 192 See Rosenstein, supra note 12. 
 193 See Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injec-
tion Sites, supra note 118. 
 194 21 U.S.C. § 903; The power for the federal government to preempt state 
law is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which 
states that the “Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 195 E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 196 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (quoting 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). In interpreting poten-
tial ‘Supremacy Clause’ cases, the Supreme Court analyzes local ordinances in 
the same way as state laws. See Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
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laws that “positive[ly] conflict” with its sections, “so that the two 
cannot consistently stand together.”197 It is not entirely clear, 
though, that the creation of a supervised injection site would posi-
tively conflict with § 856. 
 The language of § 856 seemingly excludes bona fide medical 
and scientific interventions involving controlled drugs.198 The stat-
ute generally forbids facilitating or using “any controlled sub-
stance,”199 but, as mentioned below, the federal government has not 
typically applied this statute to prosecute a facility whose purpose 
involves a legitimate medical practice.200 Indeed, courts have found 
that § 856 is not implicated when the consumption of drugs is 
“merely incidental” to the purpose of maintaining that particular res-
idence.201 The reasoning behind this exception is that the primary 
purpose of enacting the “Crack House Statute” was “to punish those 
who use their property to run drug businesses—hence, the more 
characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it is that 
the property is being used ‘for the purpose of’ those drug activities 
prohibited by § 856(a)(1).”202 These supervised injection sites can 
therefore be interpreted as falling outside of § 856 because their pur-
pose is to minimize the threat to the public’s health and welfare re-
sulting from unsafe, public injections of illegal opioids—far re-
moved from the targeted drug-profiting establishments.203 
For similar reasons, these supervised injection sites are wholly 
consistent with the entirety of the Controlled Substances Act. The 
Act puts a particular emphasis on establishing long-term federal 
strategies that include both effective law enforcement and health 
programs, “recogni[zing] that education, treatment, rehabilitation, 
 
 197 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018). 
 198 See 21 U.S.C. § 856. 
 199 See 21 U.S.C. § 856. 
 200 See United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2019) 
(“But the Third Circuit has not yet considered the proper construction of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 856(a), and although other courts of appeals have addressed that subsection, no 
court has yet considered its application to medically supervised consumption 
sites.”). 
 201 See, e.g., United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 202 United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296–97 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 203 See Supervised Consumption Services, supra note 71. 
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research, training, and law enforcement efforts are interrelated.”204 
As noted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Moore, the Con-
trolled Substances Act is not simply focused on the general use of 
drugs, but also “the diversion of drugs from legitimate channels to 
illegitimate channels.”205 The act explicitly acknowledges that many 
controlled substances may have legitimate medical use and “are nec-
essary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American 
people.”206 Thus, if these facilities can be viewed as more than “a 
taxpayer-sponsored haven to shoot up,”207 and instead as medical 
centers where health care providers are ameliorating general public 
health risks, then a supervised injection site should be reasonably 
considered to be legitimate medical practice under the Controlled 
Substances Act.208 
C. The Gonzales Cases and Federal Preemption 
Considering the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of a 
supervised injection site as a legitimate medical facility, the preemp-
tion analysis is not straightforward. The federal government has not, 
and likely will not, view any established supervised injection site as 
serving a legitimate medical purpose, which puts these state-spon-
sored facilities and their users in direct conflict with both the “Crack 
House Statute” and the Controlled Substances Act.209 However, two 
cases exemplify how a court may analyze this potential conflict. 
The first case involves a federal official’s authority to unilater-
ally interpret what constitutes a legitimate medical practice—an is-
sue decided in Gonzales v. Oregon.210 In essence, this case illus-
trates the extent of federal authority to interpret whether a super-
vised injection site constitutes a legitimate medical facility and, con-
sequently, whether its establishment falls under federal jurisdic-
tion.211 
 
 204 21 U.S.C. § 1101(6). 
 205 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135 (1975). 
 206 21 U.S.C. § 801(1). 
 207 See Rosenstein, supra note 12. 
 208 See 21 U.S.C. § 801. 
 209 See, e.g., Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed 
Injection Sites, supra note 118; Rosenstein, supra note 12. 
 210 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006). 
 211 See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 234 & n.85. 
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In 1994, Oregon voters enacted the Oregon Death With Dignity 
Act (“ODWDA”), which allowed physician-assisted suicide for pa-
tients with incurable, irreversible diseases that would otherwise die 
within six months.212 Under the law, the administering physician is 
required to follow particular medical procedures, keep records, and 
be registered both with the state Board of Medical Examiners and 
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.213 The doctor may 
only dispense the prescription, but may not administer it.214 How-
ever, on November 9, 2001, the acting attorney general issued an 
Interpretive Rule that determined that using substances to assist in 
suicide is not a legitimate medical practice; therefore, any doctor 
who dispenses or prescribes these drugs is arguably acting unlaw-
fully under the Controlled Substances Act.215 Several plaintiffs chal-
lenged this Interpretive Rule, as it would substantially disrupt the 
ODWDA regime.216 
The Supreme Court answered the question of whether the attor-
ney general, or any other executive official, had the authority to in-
dependently interpret federal law.217 The Court explained in Gonza-
les v. Oregon that the Controlled Substances Act does not manifest 
an intent to “regulate the practice of medicine generally.”218 Instead, 
Congress regulated medical practice insofar as trafficking or dealing 
illegal drugs.219 The Act’s silence in defining exactly what consti-
tutes a legitimate medical practice, according to the Court, is “un-
derstandable given the structure and limitations of federalism, which 
allow the States ‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate 
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of 
all persons.’”220 Without an explicit statute to say otherwise or give 
proper definitions congruent with the Interpretive Rule, the Supreme 
Court explained, the Attorney General was not authorized to bar 
 
 212 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 251–52. 
 213 Id. at 252. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 253–54; see also Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Sui-
cide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56607-02 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 216 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 254. 
 217 Id. at 263. 
 218 Id. at 270. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. (citations omitted). 
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dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicides in the face of 
a state medical regime permitting such conduct.221 
When comparing the analysis of Gonzales v. Oregon to the cre-
ation of supervised injection sites, apparent differences emerge be-
cause of the existence of the “Crack House Statute.” Since the Con-
trolled Substances Act was silent on the legality of physician-as-
sisted suicides, the Court agreed that the State of Oregon, not the 
Attorney General, was authorized to define whether that action con-
stituted legitimate medical practice.222 This differs from the “Crack 
House Statute,” which expressly opposes any place that operates for 
the purposes of using illegal drugs.223 Therefore, the challenge to 
state-sanctioned supervised injection sites would more closely par-
allel Gonzales v. Raich, a case involving a conflict between the Con-
trolled Substances Act and an enacted medical marijuana law in Cal-
ifornia.224 
D. Gonzales v. Raich and the Federal Government’s Overreach to 
Supervised Injection Sites 
Like a federal challenge to supervised injection sites, the situa-
tion presented in Gonzales v. Raich did not have clear-cut suprem-
acy clause preemption, even in the face of apparently conflicting 
federal and state laws.225 In 1996, California passed a state law that 
allowed physicians to prescribe medical marijuana to patients and 
primary caregivers without fear of state prosecution.226 The law also 
protected the patients and caregivers from local prosecution for ei-
ther possession or cultivation of marijuana, so long as their prescrip-
tion had been lawfully approved.227 After a federal raid into one of 
the respondents’ homes, which destroyed several marijuana plants, 
an action was brought against the Attorney General and DEA seek-
ing injunctive relief from the enforcement of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.228 The State of California challenged the Controlled 
 
 221 Id. at 274. 
 222 Id. 
 223 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2018). 
 224 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
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Substances Act’s categorical prohibition on the manufacture and 
possession of marijuana, arguing that this prohibition exceeded 
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.229 
This Congressional authority is derived from Article I of the 
United States Constitution, which states that “Congress shall have 
Power To . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”230 
In essence, a portion of the congressional authority has been defined 
as the power to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce.231 
The Commerce Clause’s authority, however, is not unlimited. In 
seeking to preserve a system of dual sovereignty—where Con-
gress’s powers are restricted to those enumerated in the Constitu-
tion—local economic activity must “substantially affect interstate 
commerce,” or the relevant federal law gives way to state legisla-
tion.232 To illustrate, the Supreme Court has struck down federal 
criminal laws purporting to regulate interstate commerce that, in 
fact, encroached on state police power—central to those decisions 
was that both statutes were noneconomic in nature.233 The Court 
worried that “[w]ere the Federal Government to take over the regu-
lation of entire areas of traditional state control—areas having noth-
ing to do with the regulation of commercial activities—the bounda-
ries between the spheres of federal and state authority would 
blur.”234 
In analyzing whether Congress overstepped its authority under 
the Commerce Clause, the Raich Court ruled against California, 
holding that the conflicting portions of the Controlled Substances 
Act were a valid exercise of the federal government’s Commerce 
Clause power.235 Unlike those statutes in the above-mentioned 
Commerce Clause cases, the activities regulated by the Controlled 
Substances Act are “quintessentially economic.”236 The California 
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 230 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 231 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 
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statute in question permitted both possession and cultivation of an 
illegal drug, and when those local activities were aggregated across 
the entire state, the Court found little question of its economic effect 
on interstate commerce, therefore holding that the federal law gov-
erned.237 
Importantly for the argument to establish a supervised injection 
site, however, the Court analyzed Gonzales v. Raich in terms of 
“whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medic-
inal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are 
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally”238—as op-
posed to a supervised injection site, which would not legalize, en-
courage, or otherwise authorize the cultivation of opioids.239 Schol-
arly writing about supervised injection has pointed to this holding in 
Gonzales v. Raich as being detrimental to the programs’ lawful es-
tablishment, with the assumption that these supervised injection 
sites will have a parallel impact on interstate commerce.240 Yet, this 
simplistic assumption ignores all empirical data known about super-
vised injection sites, which, according to a collection of modern re-
search, do not increase drug use in surrounding areas.241 Without 
any effect on the usage of opioids in cities that have established su-
pervised injection sites, there can be no rational link to the interstate 
supply or demand of that specific illegal commodity. Therefore, to 
say that utilizing supervised injection sites is “economic” in the 
same way that the legalization of a controlled substance for a medi-
cal purpose is considered “economic” defies rational, evidence-
based thought. 
Indeed, supervised injection sites will not decriminalize posses-
sion or encourage cultivation of injection-based opioids, but instead 
 
 237 Id. at 33. Using Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and other rele-
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will allow those already obtained to be safely injected in a sanitary 
location.242 The differences between the circumstances in the Raich 
case compared to any challenges to a supervised injection site are 
apparent. Whereas the Raich Court could rationally speculate an ef-
fect on interstate commerce for a law that authorizes the production 
of a controlled substance, supervised injection sites simply are 
mechanisms to protect vulnerable populations from the harmful ef-
fects of injection-based opioids. Further, the above-mentioned re-
search on supervised injection sites refutes any notion that these 
sites will cause illegal markets for injection-based opioids to grow. 
Without any empirical evidence to the contrary, the federal govern-
ment’s use of the “Crack House Statute” to prosecute future super-
vised injection sites would be infringing on the type of local, non-
economic activity that the Supreme Court has explicitly allocated to 
the states. Supervised injection sites should not be federally 
preempted, and states will likely be successful in defending against 
inevitable federal prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
While states like California have been quick to ‘bend the knee’ 
to federal threats regarding supervised injection sites,243 the federal 
government’s grounds for prosecution are weak. Even so, on Janu-
ary 15, 2020, Surgeon General Jerome Adams reiterated the govern-
ment’s opposition to these sites, stating that he has “seen little to no 
data suggesting they are overall more effective than expanding sy-
ringe services programs.”244 Hopefully, states will continue to push 
for the creation of supervised injection sites to sensibly reduce 
harms associated with unsafe, public injection of opioids. Although 
it is impossible to know whether the presence of a supervised injec-
tion site may have saved someone like Blake Hadden and allowed 
him to walk across the stage at Furman University, the empirical 
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evidence is promising that these sites will begin to reverse some of 
the detrimental effects from the opioid crisis and give some peo-
ple—who would otherwise overdose—another day to live.245 
 
 245 See Potier et al., supra note 241, at 50–62. 
